\u201cBut you\u2019ve already killed those killers of \u2018Uthman from Basrah,\u201d said al-Qa\u2018qa\u2018, \u201cand before you killed them, you were nearer to the right way than you are now. You killed 600 men bar one, and 6,000 became enraged for their sake and withdrew from your cause and deserted you!\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(On the day of the Battle of the Camel, to Zubayr bin al-\u2018Awwam and Talha bin \u2018Ubaydullah) \u2013 History of Al-Tabari<\/em> <\/em>[i]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n And so was Russia until 2020, before it leaned towards and conspired with Turkey in Syria, preventing Syria and its allies from finding ways to expel Turkey from Syrian territories, before it aligned with Turkey and Azerbaijan in their war against Armenia, culminating in the defeat of Armenia in the Karabakh region, and before launching its military campaign in Ukraine in February 2022 and drowning in a war of attrition that drained its military, financial, human, scientific, and other resources, Russia was closer to protecting its strategic interests and maintaining geopolitical stability in the Caucasus, along its western borders, and in Syria and Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine led to the opposite of all its intended goals (see Russia and Ukraine between Newtonian and Quantum Conditions: The Emergence of the Ukraine-Poland Pole<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>for reference). Since 2020, Russia\u2019s collusion with Azerbaijan and Turkey reached an unprecedented peak on September 20, 2023, when Azerbaijan started \u201canti-terror measures\u201d were being carried out in part to \u201cdisarm and secure the withdrawal of formations of Armenia\u2019s armed forces from our territories, neutralize their military infrastructure\u2026and ultimately restore [Azerbaijan\u2019s] constitutional order\u201d. [ii]<\/a> This, contrary to Russian strategic interests, will cause its exit from the South Caucasus and reshape the geopolitical landscape in this region to harm Russia\u2019s vital interests, undermine its presence, and force it to close its military bases there. Russia had been investing its efforts to establish and maintain these for an extended period to defend its influence in a region where several interests converge and where adversaries and competitors vie for influence, including regional players such as Iran, Turkey, and Israel, as well as global powers like China, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps Russia followed the example of the conflict between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan over water and river resources that had been an opportunity to establish long-term military bases (until 204) in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to protect them from the Uzbek incursion in 2018. Russia appears to be replicating a similar strategy in the South Caucasus, taking advantage of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia to establish military bases in the Karabakh region. In fact, the agreement reached in Moscow in 2020 between Baku and Yerevan allowed for the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces for five years to monitor the situation along their borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, comparing the two situations is flawed due to the differences in geopolitical and temporal contexts between the two regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the first case, Russia was basking in the glory of its victory in annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, captivating the attention of its allies in Central Asia. Russia was also engaged in successful battles alongside its allies in Syria. There was no determination from then-US President Donald Trump to exhaust Russia or engage it in a war of attrition. Russia imposed its influence in Central Asia, and conducted an urgent and swift security campaign in Kazakhstan in January 2022, restoring calm and stability without facing challenges from China, Iran, or Turkey for influence in the region at that time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The geopolitical landscape in 2023 shifted, particularly in the Caucasus. Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the West has aimed to encircle and geopolitically besiege Russia. Finland and Sweden joined NATO to exert pressure on Russia from the north and tighten the grip on the Baltic Sea. If Sweden and Denmark take control of the straits and gateway of the Baltic Sea, this strategy would impede Russia\u2019s access to the external world through this route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NATO alliance is also active in the Black Sea, a vital maritime region that Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union have long dominated. It holds strategic importance for Russian vital interests and serves as a crucial route for connections to the Mediterranean, Africa, and Southern and Eastern Europe. NATO\u2019s presence in the Black Sea today competes with Russia\u2019s, aiming to narrow its influence, especially compared to the historical dominance it enjoyed over the region via the Azov Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, Turkish, Iranian, Israeli, American, and European interests in the South Caucasus converge and clash. These parties vie for influence and footholds in the region, creating a complex web of geopolitical dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Russia and its peacekeeping forces of failing to protect Armenian civilians in Karabakh (Artsakh), an allegation denied by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov[iii]<\/a>. Armenia goes as far as accusing Russia of betrayal and collusion with Azerbaijan and Turkey to reintegrate the region into Azerbaijani sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps, immediate and tactical interests are leading Russia to lean towards Azerbaijan, prioritizing them over lasting strategic interests with Armenia. Since 2018, Russia has been displeased with Armenia when Nikol Pashinyan ascended to power following riots and protests that ousted the previous Moscow-friendly government. Moscow\u2019s concerns escalated when the new leadership in Yerevan demonstrated a tilt towards the West, particularly the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia has been following a misguided strategy since then, promoting an approach that encourages Armenia to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is binding it with Russia. This also pushes Armenia to loosen its ties within the Eurasian Union led by Moscow and consider potential membership in NATO despite Turkey\u2019s objections. Such a move would constrain Russia, limiting its maneuverability and burdening it with strategic security constraints in the north, west, and south.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Armenia might also seek EU membership, aligning itself economically and militarily with the West along its southern borders. At that point, Armenia could request Russia to close its military bases on its territory, given the perceived Russian failure to protect Armenia, secure its borders, and safeguard its interests, and its inaction vis-\u00e0-vis Azerbaijan\u2019s aggressive actions against Armenia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s policies in the Caucasus will lead to the emergence and completion of the Zangezur Corridor, connecting Azerbaijan to Turkey through historical Armenian territories and the Nakhchivan region. Turkey has sought to build this corridor for a long time, aiming to link Turkish Central Asia and China with Europe. Turkey envisions becoming a hub for oil, gas, commodities, energy pipelines, and information after removing geopolitical obstacles by returning Karabakh (Artsakh) to Azerbaijan. This weakens Armenia, rendering it incapable of resisting Turkey and Azerbaijan\u2019s forced establishment of the Zangezur Corridor, despite Yerevan\u2019s opposition. Azerbaijan may request Russia to withdraw its forces and bases from the Karabakh region when the situation stabilizes in the South Caucasus. If Russia refuses, there might be a forceful expulsion after its power and military capabilities have weakened and diminished in the Ukraine war. Ankara and Baku are unlikely to fear Russian anger and forceful removal from the South Caucasus, leaving the region devoid of Russian physical presence and influence or power for the first time in three centuries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, Russia\u2019s misguided strategy creates geopolitical risks for Iran due to changes in the geopolitical landscape. Iran has expressed concerns about this shift, with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stating, \u201cTehran rejects any changes to the existing Iranian borders with Armenia.\u201d [iv]<\/a> Iran faces several dangers: Armenia\u2019s NATO membership brings its military infrastructure closer to Iran\u2019s borders and increases the presence of strategic weapons and military maneuvers near Tehran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The establishment of the Zangezur Corridor will undermine the foundations of the North-South Iranian-Russian corridor and threaten Armenia with either disappearance or geopolitical subordination to Turkey, jeopardizing the strategic regional balance favoring Iran over Turkey after decades of Iranian-Armenian alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Azerbaijan\u2019s dominance and its strengthened position drive it to form alliances with Israel, hosting logistical and security bases for Israel on its territory. This poses a threat to the stability and existence of the Iranian regime, especially after the formation of the Turkish-Israeli-Azerbaijani alliance. This alliance might attract other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Pakistan, encircling and debilitating Iran.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s withdrawal from the South Caucasus would encourage the West and China to compete for influence in Central Asia, making them more assertive in expanding their geopolitical footprint in the only remaining circle of Russian influence. The West may be prompted to bring Georgia into NATO following the people\u2019s revolution against the government of Irakli Garibashvili, the successor to the Georgian Dream regime that slowed Georgia\u2019s drift towards the West and improved relations with Russia after the anti-Russian policies of former President Mikheil Saakashvili.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, this will weaken Russian influence in Syria, Libya, and Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n President Putin\u2019s inclination to prioritize transient, short-term interests over enduring ones, and favoring tactical considerations over strategic ones\u2014 exemplified by Russia\u2019s relationship with Turkey \u2014 along with his inclination for revenge and personal grievances, might lead to undermining significant strategic interests for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n President Putin may have found solace when the leader of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was killed, turning Prigozhin into a lesson for others in Russia. However, he has squandered significant efforts and strategic interests in Africa, which were once under Wagner’s patronage but are now weakening and slowly disappearing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similarly, President Putin may have vented his anger with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan due to his pro-Western policies and alignment with the West. However, Putin effectively ended the Russian presence in the South Caucasus, something he did not need.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It appears that Russia was closer to protecting its interests, preserving its vital space, and maintaining its polar position before 2020 than it is today. This situation is reminiscent of the advice given by Qa\u2019qa\u2019 ibn Amr when he signaled to Zubair ibn al-\u2018Awwam and Talha ibn \u2018Ubaidullah before the Battle of the Camel in the year 36 AH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [i]<\/a> The History of Al-Tabari, Volume XVI, \u201cThe Community Divided\u201d P. 97 https:\/\/www.kalamullah.com\/Books\/The%20History%20Of%20Tabari\/Tabari_Volume_16.pdf .<\/p>\n\n\n\n [ii]<\/a> https:\/\/www.securitycouncilreport.org\/whatsinblue\/2023\/09\/briefing-on-the-situation-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-region-2.php <\/p>\n\n\n\n [iii]<\/a> https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/europe\/20230929-moscow-baku-to-decide-future-of-russian-peacekeeping-mission-in-nagorno-karabakh<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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