Authority against the People: Governance, Obedience, and Despotism in Islamic Political Doctrine
At the International Center for Geopolitical & Economic Research and Artificial Intelligence (ICGER), we advocate for a state founded on citizenship, rights, and fundamental freedoms, as delineated by the United Nations Charter and international law. The discussions and arguments in this article do not serve to justify or legitimize the policies of rulers, governments, or extremist Islamic groups targeting religious or ethnic minorities. Additionally, we do not support doctrines from traditional texts like al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya or religious governance. This article aims to explain and analyze the principles of rule and governance, along with the policies of these regimes and movements, as expressed within their own doctrinal and jurisprudential frameworks.
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In recent years, there has been an increasing public debate regarding whether Muslim rulers should be permitted or prohibited from extending greetings to non-Muslim citizens, such as Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and others, on their religious festivals. The viewpoints expressed have varied from outright prohibition to permissive acceptance.
This debate became especially evident in Syria, where numerous observers found it challenging to understand the rationale behind the refusal of the new authority headed by the transitional president Aḥmad al-Sharʿ and members of his government to extend Christmas greetings to Syrian Christian citizens. This refusal was accompanied by the denial of full religious rights, the restriction of Christian rituals and symbols (such as Christmas trees, Sunday liturgies, and the public display of crosses), as well as the persecution of Syrian ʿAlawīs along the coast and Syrian Druze in southern Syria. Concurrently, fundamental freedoms remained unacknowledged, democratic governance was rejected, and fundamental civil rights as outlined in international conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and related instruments were disregarded.
All of this stems from the understanding of authority and governance within Islam itself. Al-Māwardī notably states in al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya: “Imamate is established to succeed prophethood as a means of safeguarding the deen [religion] and managing worldly affairs.”[i] Thus, the ruler is appointed to uphold and enforce Islamic laws and religious rulings; this is the fundamental reason for conferring authority. If the ruler instead emphasizes the rights of non-Muslim citizens or adopts principles from human rights, international law, international humanitarian law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the United Nations Charter, he would be acting against the original purpose of his institution.
Therefore, when the Syrian transitional president Aḥmad al-Sharʿs chooses not to extend Christmas greetings to Syrian Christian citizens and instead emphasizes the implementation of Islamic law while conducting campaigns against Syrian ʿAlawīs and Druze, groups historically classified in Islamic political literature as extremist sects (ghulāt), it is, within this framework, executing the rulings of the Sharīʿa and the principles of Islamic political governance.
Therefore, there is no justification for insisting that an Islamic ruler act against the original purpose of their position. According to Islamic political doctrine, it is pointless to criticize Muslim rulers for not engaging in the rituals, ceremonies, or religious celebrations of non-Muslim populations. The common social media criticism directed at Muslim rulers for not participating in non-Muslim religious festivities, in this context, amounts to expecting actions that Islam itself does not mandate.
Furthermore, the legal acceptance of seizing power by force (taghallub bi-l-sayf) in Islamic political thought, especially among the Ashʿarī tradition[ii] and ahl al-ḥadīth,[iii] triggered a historical shift toward authoritarianism. Over centuries, this progression led to a system of Islamic despotism, where tyranny, autocracy, dictatorship, repression, persecution, and security-driven governance have become characteristic of the modern state in much of the Muslim world.
The idea that rulers in the Islamic world are above constitutions and laws and not accountable for their actions has deep roots in the intellectual traditions of the Ashʿarīs, ahl al-ḥadīth, and jurists of al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya. These scholars focused on royal politics, administration, and governance, outlining extensive rights owed to the imam or ruler by the people. However, they imposed duties on the populace without establishing corresponding rights over the ruler, the amīr, or the caliph. They emphasized the caliph’s rights over God but neglected to specify the subjects’ rights against him.
Since only God would judge the caliph on the Day of Judgment, there was no earthly authority authorized to question or hold him accountable. Consequently, the ruler’s powers were effectively unrestricted, leading to the development of absolute rule in Islamic political history.
We therefore proceed to examine the juristic principles governing the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims with respect to the ruler within Islamic territories.
The Ashʿarīs, ahl al-ḥadīth, and the jurists of al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya enumerated ten obligations of the imam, none of which include political rights for the populace. Al-Māwardī states:
“There are ten matters regarding affairs of a public nature which are binding on him:
1. He must guard the deen as it was established in its original form and about which the first generations of the Ummah are agreed; if an innovator appears, or someone of dubious character deviates from this deen he should make clear to him the legal proof of his error, explain the right way to him and take the appropriate measures regarding his liability and his punishment such that the deen is protected from blemish and the Ummah is prevented from going astray;
2. He must execute the legal judgements between two contestants and bring to an end any dispute between two litigants so that equity prevails, the tyrant does not transgress and the weak are not oppressed;
3. He must protect the territory of Islam and defend the sanctuaries so that people may earn their sustenance and journey safe from any threat to their persons or belongings;
4. He mustestablish the hadd-punishments in order to protect what Allah, may He be exalted, has made inviolable from being violated and prevent the rights of His slaves from being abused;
5. He must fortify the border posts against attack and defend them with force against an enemy which might appear unexpectedly and violate what is sacred or shed the blood of Muslims or dhimmis protected by a pact;
6. He must make jihad against those who resist Islam after having been called to it until they submit or accept to live as a protected dhimmi-community- so that Allah’s rights, may He be exalted, “be made uppermost above all [other] religion” (Qur’an 9: 33);
7. He must collect the fay and zakah taxes from those on whom the shari’ah and legal judgement has made it an obligation to pay, and this without fear or oppression;
8. He must apportion the stipends and whatever is due from the bait al-mal without wastefulness or meanness and make payments punctually, neither before their time nor after it;
9. He must ensure the employment of trustworthy persons and the appointment of worthy counsellors capable of undertaking those tasks delegated to them and of safeguarding monies made over to them;
10. He must personally take over the surveillance of affairs and the scrutiny of circumstances such that he may execute the policy of the Ummah and defend the nation without over-reliance on delegation of authority- by means of which he might devote himself to pleasure-seeking or worship- for even the trustworthy may deceive and counsellors behave dishonestly: Allah may He be exalted, has said, “O Dawud, surely I have made you a Khalifah on the earth so decide equitably between people and do not follow passions lest you be led astray from the way of Allah” (Qur’an 38: 26).”[iv]
Since authority in the Ashʿarī tradition and among ahl al-ḥadīth is centered on the ruler, the responsibilities assigned to the political system relate to issues that do not directly affect individual rights and freedoms or those of the broader population (al-raʿiyya, the subjects).
An examination of the responsibilities inherent to the political system indicates that they primarily involve enforcing religion and the Sharīʿa, as well as rebutting those who disseminate doubts and heterodox ideas (aṣḥāb al-shubuhāt wa-l-ahwāʾ) through scholarly debate, thereby preventing such beliefs from proliferating within the community. These obligations also include the collection of revenue for the public treasury and the ruler’s finances, encompassing kharāj, jizya, zakāt, ʿushūr, and other levies. Such funding supports military endeavors such as jihād and ghazw, as well as financing stipends, allowances, salaries, and equipment indispensable to soldiers.
When the Ashʿarīs and Ahl al-Ḥadīth addressed the issue of the rights of the people concerning the imam, they articulated a specific statement regarding those rights. Al-Māwardī states: “So if the Imam fulfils the rights of the Ummah, as we have described above, he will have executed the claim of Allah, may He be exalted, regarding their rights and their duties: in which case they have a duty to obey and support him as long as his state does not change.”[v]
The Ashʿarīs, ahl al-ḥadīth, and the jurists of al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya viewed the ruler’s fulfillment of the ten listed obligations as fulfilling his duties to the people. However, these obligations do not include fundamental political, economic, administrative, or social rights or freedoms. Instead, they focus solely on enforcing the Sharīʿa and related matters, such as carrying out ḥudūd punishments, including flogging, stoning, amputations, and beheading, and resolving disputes and legal judgments among the people. They also encompass the deployment of armies for jihād, issuing rulings on combat, captivity, the distribution of spoils (ghanāʾim) and fayʾ, and imposing jizya and kharāj. All these aspects of authority and governance were seen as the imam’s way of fulfilling the community’s rights.
Assuming the ruler had properly fulfilled these duties, they then established two additional rights for the imam: unconditional obedience (ṭāʿa muṭlaqa) and military support. If the ruler called them to fight or organized them for political or military actions, they were required to respond and take part. Not doing so was considered disobedience, insubordination, and a violation of legitimate authority.
Attempting to define the rights of the people (al-raʿiyya) or the fundamental rights of individual citizens is ultimately futile. Usually, the rights are only associated with the ruler, alongside obligations placed on the people that must be fulfilled through compliance, obedience, and submission. Any resistance is regarded as defiance or rebellion.
In this way, the Ashʿarīs, ahl al-ḥadīth, and jurists of al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya effectively nullified the rights of the people, focusing only on the rights of the ruler. They created the foundation of the Islamic despotic tradition by providing religious legitimation for the actions and policies of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rulers. These policies and rulings, many of which conflicted with the Prophet of Islam’s practices, Abū Bakr’s conduct, and ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb’s approach to state formation, are the theoretical basis of Islamic political thought. They did not condemn the policies of certain tyrants, such as ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān, al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik, and Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr, as well as later rulers from the Būyids, the Saljūqs, the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūks, and the Ottomans.
Additionally, they turned the personal tyranny initiated by Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, characterized by the execution of Companions, including beheadings of Ḥujr b. ʿAdī and the killing of ʿAmr b. al-Ḥamq, into a structured form of control rooted in theoretical ideas and backed by religious arguments. Gradually, this transformed into an ideology of Islamic despotism that justified and legitimized every act of injustice committed by rulers during the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid eras.
The Ashʿarīs and the followers of Ahl al-Ḥadīth played a significant role in embedding authoritarianism and political tyranny within Muslim states. They supplied dictatorial regimes with legal frameworks and doctrinal justifications, often endorsing policies through Islamic proofs that legitimized and systematized their rule. Consequently, tyrants in Muslim countries faced few moral or religious barriers to their repressive actions, as long as these measures aligned with principles promoted by both Ashʿarīs and Ahl al-Ḥadīth, which were considered fundamental to Islamic political governance.
To establish just states and preserve the fundamental rights and freedoms of their peoples, Muslims must dismantle despotism and tyranny. This involves adopting constitutions rooted in the spirit of their societies that protect rights and eliminate injustice, oppression, and humiliation. Achieving this requires breaking free from the Ashʿarī and ahl al-ḥadīth traditions by removing their foundational principles and constraints and freeing themselves from their intellectual captivity and hegemonic influence.
Given the governance principles in Islam, it is clear that Aḥmad al-Sharʿ and other Muslim rulers are effectively applying these rules. Supporters of a secular civil state or governance based solely on citizenship should not anticipate these rulers to prioritize human rights law or international treaties, nor act against the core principles and established rules of the Islamic political framework.
Our discussion so far explains developments in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and other Muslim nations. In these countries, religious minorities, seen as subjects, not citizens, face restrictions. Additionally, groups categorized as extremist heterodox factions (al-ghulāt min ahl al-ahwāʾ), such as ʿAlawīs and Druze, are actively targeted. These policies are implemented by the ruling authorities as acts of religious devotion, aimed at achieving closeness to God and a higher spiritual rank.
One might profoundly wonder: can we genuinely expect rulers tasked with waging jihād in the name of God, spreading Islam, imposing jizya on non-Muslims, levying kharāj on their wealth, enforcing ḥudūd punishments against those deemed deviant or heretical, and even disciplining or executing those who persist in their doctrines, to suddenly abandon these divine commands and embrace democracy, secularism, and the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
Indeed, anyone who harbors such expectations is immersed in illusion and wishful thinking.
[i] Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Baṣrī al-Baghdādī al-Māwardī, The Ordinances of Islamic Governance (al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya), trans. Asadullah Yates (London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., n.d.), 10.
[ii] Ashʿarī: “Classical Sunni theological school (tenth to twelfth centuries), founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari, that became an important religious movement forming a middle ground between the rationalism of the Mutazilis and the literalism of the Hanbalis. Used a rational approach to religious truth but preserved the primary importance of scriptural revelation as the sole source of certainty. Acknowledged that reason may play a role in defending truth, convincing others, and participating in moral actions, but held that all moral actions are governed by God. Associated with the Shafii school of law. Assimilated into the Maliki school of law in the tenth century. Opposed by Hanbalis in the eleventh century.” https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095428108
[iii] Ahl al-Hadith: “People of the traditions (of the Prophet). Also ashab al-hadith. The characterization refers to the adherents of the powerful movement of the late second and third centuries of Islam (late eighth and ninth centuries C.E.) that insisted on the authority of the traditions (hadith) attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, as against the informed “opinions” (ray) on which many contemporary juristic schools based their legal reasoning. This movement played a critical role in the emergence of Sunni Islam.” https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095357896
[iv] Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Ḥabīb al-Baṣrī al-Baghdādī al-Māwardī, The Ordinances of Islamic Governance (al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya), trans. Asadullah Yates (London: Ta-Ha Publishers Ltd., n.d.), Pp. 28-29.
[v] Ibid., p. 29.