Damp Squib: A Decade of Russian Interference in Syria
First: The Facts
Russia began its military campaign in Syria on 30 September 2015, initiating aerial bombardments in the countryside of Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Raqqa. This followed a request from Syria’s al-Asad regime for Russian assistance in its fight against armed opposition factions.
Russian President Vladimir Putin defended Russia’s actions by calling the armed opposition “terrorism” during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015. He stated there was no difference between the Syrian opposition and ISIS,[i] thus providing a political justification for intervention. At the same time, Kirill I, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia of the Russian Orthodox Church, gave a religious blessing for the Russian forces’ entry into Syria, citing the need to protect the Syrian people and especially Eastern Christians. He called the Russian campaign a “holy war,”[ii] offering both religious and moral legitimacy for Russia’s military involvement in Syria.
Russia deployed a variety of modern aircraft, including Su-25s, Su-24M2s, Su-30SMs, and Su-34s, as well as different MiG aircraft types. For the first time since the Soviet Union’s collapse, it also launched 26 “Kalibr” cruise missiles from its warships in the Caspian Sea targeting Syrian opposition forces in Aleppo, Idlib, and Raqqa. These missiles traveled 1,500 km, passing through Iranian and Iraqi airspace in October 2015,[iii] showcasing Russia’s ballistic capabilities and power for the first time since the Cold War.
Russia conducted tests of its strategic bombers—the Tu-160, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M3, all capable of nuclear payloads—over Syria, leading Putin to remark that “the war in Syria benefited the Russian military industry by addressing defects in these weapons.”[iv]
Russia also justified its intervention in Syria at that time based on two reasons:
First: the war on terrorism and the protection of the Syrian state.
Second, the eight thousand fighters from Russia and Central Asian republics fighting with the Syrian opposition, who gained combat experience, were a perceived threat to Russian national security. Therefore, it was preferable for Russia to confront them in Syria rather than on Russian soil or in the Central Asian republics.
Russia’s involvement in Syria almost led to a direct confrontation with NATO, risking a third world war and reviving Cold War tensions at the end of 2015 and in 2016. This period saw Turkey shoot down a Russian Su-24 over northern Latakia, killing one pilot and heightening tensions. Relations between Russia and Turkey deteriorated, leading to economic and diplomatic sanctions against Ankara. Putin and Russian leaders issued threats and warnings, accusing Turkey of supporting terrorism and trading oil with ISIL (Da‘ish). Former Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev even suggested that the global climate in 2016 was similar to that of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In 2016, Russia and the United States engaged in a series of negotiations, dialogues, and debates between Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry to avoid direct conflict. These efforts led to a period of relative calm and reduced tensions between Washington and Moscow.
Despite this, Russia continued to label Syrian opposition groups as terrorists, urging actions against Jabhat al-Nuṣra and launching campaigns targeting it. In December 2017, Lavrov emphasized that “eliminating Jabhat al-Nuṣra is the greatest task in combating terrorism in Syria,”[v] which angered Turkey. During a visit to Tunisia, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated: “There is no role for al-Asad in the future of the political process in Syria.”[vi]
Second: Analysis and Results
A keen political analyst might question what Russia has truly gained from its decade-long involvement in Syria, including its aerial and ground operations across the countryside, cities, mountains, and steppe. They might also inquire about the strategic results Moscow has obtained from this extensive campaign.
If, after ten years of intervention in Syria, Russia is now considering abandoning Iran and the deposed president Bashar al-Assad, and shifting toward establishing relations with the former Syrian opposition (the current Syrian authority), negotiating with Jabhat al-Nusra, and inviting its former leader Abū Muḥammad al-Jūlānī (the head of Syria’s transitional phase, Aḥmad al-Shar‘) to visit Moscow and attend the Russian-Arab summit on October 15, 2025, then why did its aircraft conduct thousands of airstrikes across various Syrian regions, destroying infrastructure and killing thousands of fighters and civilians? Why did Russia fight battles at the colleges, the Military Academy, New Aleppo, and the western neighborhoods of Aleppo city when Jabhat al-Nusra launched the “Fath al-Mubīn Operations Room” (“the Great Battle of Aleppo”) aiming to seize the city in summer 2016? Subsequently, Russia and the forces of the former regime, along with Hezbollah and other militias, launched a campaign to “liberate” eastern Aleppo neighborhoods. Russian aircraft and heavy artillery carried out hundreds of strikes, destroying homes and buildings over their residents—both civilians and fighters—forcing many to leave. This led to the complete evacuation of the eastern Aleppo neighborhoods, with residents boarding green buses to be transported to Idlib in December 2016.
It would have been much better for Russia to avoid this devastation, loss of lives, infrastructure destruction, and displacement of people—especially if, years later, it chose to overlook the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the rise of Jabhat al-Nuṣra in Syria, even inviting its leader to Moscow.
It would have been significantly more advantageous for Russia if, from late 2019 through March 2020, it had refrained from initiating a vehement conflict in the rural areas of Hama, Aleppo, and Idlib—where Russian forces, utilizing aircraft, artillery, and tanks, decimated towns such as Kafr Nabudah, Kafr Nabl, al-Laṭāminah, Morek, Khan Shaykhun, and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘mān; engaged in the most intense battles in Saraqib; reopened the M5 highway to Aleppo; and conducted the most brutal campaigns in the western and northern countryside of Aleppo, resulting in the displacement of residents from towns such as al-Manṣūrah, Kafr Da‘il, Qubṭān al-Jabal, ‘Anjarah, Ḥarītān, Ḥayyān, Bayānūn, ‘Andān, Kafr Ḥamrah, among others—causing the destruction of their homes and displacing their inhabitants—if, at that time, the primary objective was to overthrow the former al-Asad regime and establish diplomatic relations with Jabhat al-Nuṣra, the leading transitional authority in Syria?
Russia should have avoided causing such devastation, displacement, and suffering. The extent of destruction from late 2019 to March 2020 surpasses all the damage inflicted since 2011.
One might also question whether the original reasons for Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 still apply. Are Christians now protected and reassured under the current regime? Has the threat of Islamist fighters migrating into Central Asia and Russia decreased enough that Moscow feels confident withdrawing from the fight and potentially establishing relations with Jabhat al-Nuṣra?
If not, then why did Russia intervene in Syria in 2015 and oppose them? And why pursue reconciliation in 2025? This would entail Russia apologizing to Syrian civilians affected by its bombings and offering compensation for the damage to schools, hospitals, infrastructure, buildings, and homes.
This Russian strategy has raised doubts and concerns among Russia’s allies in Asia and Africa, including Iran, North Korea, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic.
Russia’s military successes in Syria from 2015 to 2020 have given it the confidence to claim that where Russia and Putin are involved, victory follows. However, since September 2024, a significant change has occurred: rulers in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic now fear that aligning with Russia will lead to neglect, regime downfall, and the fleeing of leaders, much like what happened to Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Russia’s only post-Cold War strategic win in Syria has been lost. To political observers, Russia seems to be shifting from one strategic setback to the next—initially in Syria, then in Ukraine, and potentially in Africa.
Russia is reaping the harvest of dry stubble, a consequence of its poor strategic decisions.
[i] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read-putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/
[iii] https://eadaily.com/en/news/2015/10/08/as-russia-launches-kalibr-cruise-missiles-at-terrorists-operation-in-syria-becomes-more-comprehensive?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[iv] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37507207
[v] https://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/1531587/
[vi] https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/2017/12/27/tunis-erdogan-essebsi-jerusalem